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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NATIONAL BANK OF
L<HlA~, OF LOGAN, UTAH, a
National Banking Association,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

THI•~ ~'JRNT

- vs -

No. 10621

\\'ALKER BANK & TRusrr COMl'AXY, a corporation,

Defendant-Respondent,

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
S'I'ATEl\lENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought by appellant, a National
Banking Association, for a declaratory judgment that
thf' operation of certain drive-in and walk-up facilities
(·onstruetPd hy respondent would be in violation of U.C.A.
19;>~, 7-::3-G, as arnended, and for an injunction restraining
ttRpondent from operating said drive-in and walk-up
facilities.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
'I'he case was tried by the court and the court entered
n .iudgmPnt in favor of respondent dismissing appellant's
i·ornplaint and holding that the establishment and opera1

tion of the drive-in and walk-up facilities constructed by
respondent would not constitute the establishment of a
branch bank within the meaning of U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6,
as amended, but would constitute only an extension and
enlargement of respondent's Cache Valley Branch Bank.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the
trial court.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant is a National Bank with its main office
at the southwest corner of the intersection of First North
and Main Streets in Logan, Utah. Appellant also operates a branch at 442 North Main Street in the city (R. 64,
Tr. 7), which is the subject matter of the litigation in
Walker Bank & Trnst Compa;ny v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 90
(10th Cir. 1965), cert. granted, 34 U.S. Law Week, 3377
(Mar. 3, 1966), No. 875. Respondent is a state bank having
its main office a.t Salt Lake City, Utah, and a branch (the
Cache Valley Branch) located at the northeast corner of
the intersection of First North and Main Streets in
Logan, Utah.
The Cache Valley Branch was acquired by respondent in 1956 as a result of a statutory merger whereby the
Cache Valley Banking Company was merged with and
into Walker Bank & Trust Company. At the time of the
merger respondent did not acquire the ownership of the
real property on which the banking business was conducted. However, in December of 1964 it became the
2

in fpe simple of all of the land and buildings shown
on Exhibit "2 '' ( R. 17 and R. 64, Tr. 8), including the
land on which the drive-in and walk-up facilities in
qurstion are located, subject only to the 12 foot right of
way shown on said Exhibit (Ibid.).
owll<'l'

The portion of the building marked "A" on Exhibit
"2" was occupied at the time of the trial by Utah Mortgage Loan Corporation but arrangements had been made
for it to vacate so that the entire premises would be
oecupied by respondent for banking purposes. The expansion was required by respondent due to the overcrowded conditions and to provide better services for
the cm;tomers at its Cache Valley Branch. (R. 64, Tr. 20~2). ~While the record does not so show, the entire
premises are now occupied by respondent and used for
hanking purposes.
1'1w drive-in and walk-up facilities in question are
f'hown on the photographs, Exhibits 3, 4 and 5 (R. 17,
'rr. 21-22). They are located on the land owned by
n•spondent immediately east of the 12 foot right of
way, and the nearest of the two drive-in and walk-up
faeilitit>s is 14 feet 6 inches east of the easterly wall of
the main building (R. 17, Ex. 2). At the time of the
trial the facilities had not been placed in operation but
Owy were then connected to the main building by means
of pneumatic tubes, and it was testified that upon com]lletion of the remodeling of the main building the tubes
would he extended to the first teller's cage in the main
building. (R. 64, Tr. 23). The testimony shows that at
the time the facilities were to be put in operation, deposits
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made at the facilities, together with the deposit slips,
would h(' trans111ittPd through the tubes to the firnt
telll:'r's cage in the 111ain building and funds used in tltt·
facilitil:'s for paying withdrawals and cashing checks
would be sent from that cage through the tubes to the
facilities. (R 64, Tr. 23-2-l). Although the record dol's
not so show, the pro,jected remodeling, including the
extension of the pneumatic tubes has been completed,
and the facility is presently in operation according to
plan. These facts show that the operation of the facilities
is connected with and a part of the branch operation.
Neither the Utah State Banking Commissioner nor
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
has granted any authority to respondent to operate the
drive-in and walk-up facilities.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE PROPOSED DRIVE-IN AND WALK-UP FACILITIES OF RESPONDENT DO NOT CONSTITUTE A
BRANCH BANK WITHIN THE MEANING OF U.C.A.
1953, 7-3-6, AS AMENDED.

Since Logan is a city of the second class the operation of an additional branch in that city by respondent
would be prohibited by U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, as amended,
·which provides in part:
Except in cities of the first class, or within unincorporated areas of a county, in which a city
of the first class is located, no branch bank shall
be established in any city or town in which is
located a bank or banks, state or national, regu4

la rly t rans:wt i ng a (·nstornar:• ban king business,

nnlPss tht• hank SP<>king to establish such branch

:-:!tall tah ovPr an existing bank.

'l'lw sole q1wstion 1n·esPnted in this case is whether
tlie OJH'rntion b~· n·spondPnt of tlw drivP-in and walk-up
fa<'ilit i(•:-: in qtwstion eonstitutPs the establishment of a
liran('h hank as that knn is defined in U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6,
a:" m11Pnd<·d, or whether the operation of said facilities
('()Jlstitut<•s merel~- an extt>nsion or enlargement of respondl'11t 's Pxisting branch. 'rhe term branch bank is
dd'irn•d in the> above statute as follows:
1'hP term 'branch' as used in this act shall be held
to include any branch bank, branch office, branch
agency, additional office or any branch place of
lmsiness at which dPposits ar<:> received or checks
paid or mon<:>y l<:>nt.
Respondent contends that the operation of the proposed
facilities represents a mere extension or enlargement
of its existing branch and does not constitute the estabfo~hment of an additional branch bank.
(A)

OPIN"TOXS OF THE ATTORNEYS GENl~RAL OI<-, UTAH AND OTHER STATES
Sl rpp()RT RESPONDENT'S POSITION.

11 lw Attorne~· General of the State of Utah has
i1•rnl('n•<l an opinion, No. 66-025, dated March 25, 1966,
at t liP request of thP Ftah State Bank Commissioner.
'J'l1is opinion states that a drive-in facility similar to the
1hin-in and walk-up facilities of respondent would not be
:1 liranch within the meaning of Section 7-3-6. A copy
of his opinion, a copy of the letter referred to therein,
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and a ('Opy of related doeuments ar<> sPt forth m thP
appendix to this hrief.
'l'he Attorney General concluded that such a facility
was a part of the main bank because of the physical
connection between the two by means of the pneumatic
tube through which the money and documents would vass
back and forth. His reasoning in that opinion is applicable to the case now before the court. Respondent':;
drive-in facilities at the time of the trial were connected
to the main building by pneumatic tubes, and the evidencr
further shows that upon the completion of the remodeling and the expansion of the facilities at the branch the
tube would be extended to the first teller's cage and
deposits made at the facilities would be transmitted to
the teller's cage through thf' tuhes, and funds used in the
facilities for paying withdrawals- and cashing checks
would be transmitted from said teller's cage through
said tubes. (R. 64, Tr. 23-24).
Appellant has set forth opinions of the attorneys
general of fourteen other states in its brief and states
that respondent's facilities tnary have been a branch
according to nine of these opinions. However, a review
of these opinions, which were ref erred to in respondent's
trial brief in the case below, reveal that thirteen of
the fourteen opinions concluded that the drive-in facilitiP~
involved did not constitute branches and the remaining
opinion (Appellant's Brief at 22.) states that a facility
which is separated by more than an alley and which is
not adjacent to the main banking house is prohibited.
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In ap1wllant's analysis of th<· ovinions of the attorrwys general r<:>f{'rred to above (Appellant's Brief at 28.)
and in appellant's statement of facts (Appellant's Brief
at :1.) reference is made to the occupancy of a portion
of respondent's premises by a separate business establishm{'nt. lt is stated on page 28 of Appellant's Brief
th.at n•spondent's facilities would be a branch in the State
of lllinois because they are separated from the main
building by an intervening business establishment. On
page :3 of said brief appellant states that there is no
prohibition against leasing the offices which were occupied by the separate business to others after the drive-in
facilities are open for business by respondent. In these
argmn{'nts appellant ignores Finding of Fact No. 5
(R. 50) whieh states that the business occupying a portion
of the respondent's building between the banking operation and the proposed facilities will be vacated by the
<·orporation occupying it and will be occupied by respond(•11t at or about the time the operation of the facilities
c·mrunPnC{'S. ln addition, the trial court in its memorandm11 decision, dated March 14, 1956 (R. 64, Tr. 35) impmwd thP condition that the intervening business establishnwnt be moved out and that all signs and marks
indicating the presence of it be removed so that there
would remain no intervening business operating between
thP main building and the proposed facilities. It must
hP assmned that the respondent will comply with the
11>\\'<'r eourt's order in this regard, and, in fact, the above
l'P'lnirenwnts of the trial court have already been accomplislwd.

7

(B) CA8E8 I1'ROl\l OTHER .J l1RISDIC'l'ION~
HAVE DEALT WI'l'll THE ISSFl1~ 0~'

\VHE'l'HER DRl VI~-lN F ACILITU~S
BRANCHES.

AIU~

'rhen' are no Utah cases dealing with the issue of
whether or not driw-in and walk-up facilities at a hank
constitute a branch hut cases have heen decided in othPr
jurisdictions dt>aling with this issue. In J.llichiqan Nntional Bank v. Saxon, Civil No. 821-62, D. D.C., July 2G,
1962, the plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that a
drive-in facilitv five hundred feet distant from the
establislmi1~ branch \Yas not an additional branch but
merely a part of or an extension of the existing branch.
In deciding that the facility was not an additional branch,
the court referrc>d first to the definition of the term
"branch" as defined in Rev. Stat.~ 5155 (:1875), 12 lT.f.l.C.
~ 36(f), which is identical in wording to the Utah statute
defining branch and in an unpublished opinion, a copy
of which is found in the record of this case (R. 30-36),
stated:
The only possible phrase that could apply to
the drive-in facility involved in this case is tlw
phrase 'additional ~ff ice.' It does not mean, ho\\·ever, that every time a bank rents an additional
room or additional offices in another building, a~
hanks do sometimes when their business Pxpands,
that they are opening a new hraneh, the word:-;
'additional office' must be reasonabl v construed
as meaning a separate and independent office.
operating in the same way as branch bwnks generally operate, and not merely additional office
space to an existing facility.
Here we have a small structure eonnedPd by
a pneumatic tube and operating as part of the
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(Jrn11r:li 1ww e.risti11q. lt se(•Jlls unn·asonahle to the
('ourt to call that a separate branch. (Emphasis
added.) (R. 33-34)

ApJH"llant in his brief on page 7 cites Continental
H1111/,· & Trust Co. r. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 370, 384 P.2d 796
(1 ~163), as authority for the proposition that the holding
and language of the Michigan National Bank case is inapplicahk to the case before the court. The Continental
(•a;;e hPh1 that the making of loans hy banks through in:~nranee ageuts who prepared the necessary documents
for such loans which were then forwarded by said agents
to the bank was in violation of Section 7-3-6. These loans
\\'ne 1wgotiated either'' at the office or home of the agent
or t hP office or home of the customer or even upon the
,;tn'et." 14 Utah 2d at 376, 384 P.2d at 800. The facts
in that ('USP are in no way comparable to the facts in the
in;;tant c·as<>. The Attorney General of Utah in Opinion
:\' n. f)(i-025, supra, distinguishes the Continental case from
a va:-:<· involving a drive-in facility.
In Jackson v. First National Bank, 246 F. Supp. 134
I ~l.D. Ga. 1965), the court held that a drive-in facility
2~HJ.;)7 fret distant from the main building in no way
1·onnPdPd to the main building other than by telephone
and s<·paratPd from the main building by ten buildings
('ontaining husinessPs and hy an allt>y, was a branch bank.
.\ppPllnnt in its brief on pages 11 and 12 states that
thr rourt in the Jackson case said that a lack of a pneu111ati<' tnlw made no difference in its decision and that
t Jii. eonrt did not eonsidPr a tu he a physical connection.
('(Intra r>· to these inferPnce;;: in Appellant's Brief, the
1 (1nrt :-:ai<l thP lll'E'SPBCP or ahsencr of a pneumatic tube
9

was 1wrhaps a r<'levant factor for considPration hut that
the absence of ~mch a tnbP was not a controlling fact
in the case muler considera.tion. It is clear that the ahsen('e of a pneumatic tube in a case where the proposed
facility was as far removed from the main building
as described above, would not be a significant additional
fact. However, in the case before this court where a
distance of only fourteen feet, six inches separates the
facilities from the main building, where there are no
intervening businesses and where the land is owned by
respondent over which the intervening right-of-way is
located, the presence of pneumatic tubes is important
since it demonstrates that the facility is operated as part
of the branch and that the two are physically connected.
In State Clwrtered Banks in Washington v. Peoplri)
National Bank, Civil No. 6338, W.D. Wash., February 28,
1966, one of the issues decided by the court was whether
a drive-in facility was a branch within the meaning of
Rev. Stat. § 5155 (1875 ), 12 U.S.C. § 36(f). In deciding
the issue, the court looked at the physical situation involved and stated in an unreported memorandum decision
that the "proposed facility is some 260 feet or more from
the principal office, on a separate lot, in another block,
across a busy thoroughfare, has a different address and
is in a completely disconnected building. No stretching
of the term 'additional office' is required at all to see it
fits perfectly. The proposed facility is, therefore, a
'branch' within the meaning of the federal statute.''
In Great Plains Life lnsuratnee Co. v. First National
Bank, 316 S.W. 2d 98 (Tex. Civ. App. 1958), plaintiff

10

;;ought a court decree that its lease with defendant was
voi<l on the ground, among others, that defendant was
('onducting an illegal bank business on the leased premises
herause of three tellers' windows located across an alley
from the banking office. The tellers' windows were conMcted to the banking office with pneumatic tubes and
a tunnel. The court quoted the Texas banking code as
follows:

X o . . . bank shall engage in business in more
than onf' plaC(', maintain any branch office, or
eash clweks or receivt> deposits except in its own
banking house.
ln deciding for the defendant, the court said:
As we understand a branch bank, it is a separate entity and deposits made in a branch bank
an• payable there and only there unless the branch
bank be cl.osed or demand for the payment by the
dt>positor be refused, then demand for the payment will be against the mother bank. For convenienct> of its depositors three teller's windows
were established to permit a depositor to drive
in and make a deposit, and there is nothing in
this record to show that the tellers of the drive-in
portion of the bank had any more authority than
any otlwr tellers in the bank building proper.
'rhis drive in depository is nothing more than a
part of the appellee bank. All deposits made at
the tellers' windows are placed in appellee's bank.
[ t is clear from the foregoing cases that in determining tht> issue of "~hether or not a drive-in facility is a
hranrh bank the courts look primarily to the distance of
thP drivt>-,in facilitit>s from the main building and to the
physical eonnt>ction between the two. When close proximity and a physical connection are found to exist, it
11

appearl' from tlw opinions of tlH• attorn<'ys g<·nPral and
from tlw <·as<'s above citPd, that the drive-in facility is
considert>d part of the lll'anch or an Pxtension or 1'11largernent tlwrPof. In eontrast to tlw fact situations pr1•1wntf'd in tlw Jackson and State Chartered Ba11ks i11
Washington rases, the proposed facilities in this case are
only fourteen feet, six inclws from the main building,
are located on the sanw parcel of land owned by rPspond<->nt on which the remainder of the branch is operated and
are connected to the main building by means of pneumati<·
tubes. The trial court has also found that the facilities
"will be operated as an integral part of the branch bank,
both from the standpoint of operation and proximity
to the main building,'' and that said operation "will providf' more convenient services for [respondent's] rustomers." ( R. 5-1-)

(C) THE ADM1N8TRATIVE INTERPRETATIOX OF THE STATFTORY DEFINITION
OF THE ·woRD "BRANCH" IS THAT l'l'
DOE~S NOT APPLY TO A DRIVl~-IN FACILITY CONNECTED -WITH AND IN CLOSI•;
PROXIMITY TO AN I~XISTING BA~K OH
BRANCH BANK.

In Utah Power & Light Co. v. Public Sen:ice Commission, 107 Utah 155, 152 P .2d 542 ( 1944), this court
stated:
Consistent administrative interpretation~
over th<.' years h~- the offict'rs chargt>d with thP
duty of applying the statute and making each
part ·work efficiently and smoothly are entitled
to p·eat weight li~- the conrts. (152 P.2d at 5rl7. l
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All statP hanks an~ und<>r thP su1wrv1s10n of the
.~tah· lianking departmPnt, P.C.A. 1953, 7-1-7, as amended,
and t lw hank co1t11nissio1wr has the power to adopt rulPs
and n·g-ulations in harmony with law to govt>rn the condud, <>JH'ration and managenwnt of statP banks, U.C.A.
rn::>:l, 7-1-..t-. rL'lw hank commissioner is also the officer
<'barged with responsibility of granting or denying appli<'ations to Pstahlish branch hanks, U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, as
(!l ! Wl1li<>d.
'l'hP Comptroller of the Currency is vested with
general administrative powers and duties for the administration of national banks and is charged \vith the duty
of their supervision, Rev. Stat.§ 324(1875),12U.S.C.§1.
H1• is also the officer charged with the duty of granting
or dPTI)'ing applications for the establishment of branches
h\· national hanks, Rev. Stat.§ 5155 (1875),12 U.S.C. § 36.
SpPncer C. 'l'aylor, thP chief banking examiner of the
l talt Stat!' Banking Department, the acting Bank Comlllissimwr in J 9GO and the Bank Commissioner 1961l 01i~>. tPstifit>cl that the drive-in facility at the principal
offi<'P of the Continental Bank & Trust Company at Salt
Lak(' City, lTtah, shown on a photograph marked Exhibit
"(j" ( R. rn-17), has bt•en operating since July 27, 1960,
tliat the drive-in facility of the Beehive State Bank at its
111ain offiee in Salt Lah City, Utah, as shown on a
1ilwtog-raph marked Exhibit ''7" (R. 16-17) has been
ll\JPrating sinee October 9, 19Gl, and that the drive-in
for·ilih" at tlw C01m11ercial Secmity Bank in Ogden at
1t;: main offie<>, shown on a photograph marked as Exlt:l1it "~" (H. lli-17) is 1·nnt>ntl)' lwing operatt>d in the
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sa111P wanner as it has lH'Pll opC'rated sinee its establishment (R. ()-!, Tr. :.W, 29, 30). He stated that the State
Banking Departnwnt, whieh is aware of all the drive-in
facilitie8 of tllP stat!, hanks in thP State of l Ttah has not
granted authorit.'· to any of tlw above thrPe na11H•d banks
for tl1P 01wration of the drive-in facilities shown on the
exhihits (R. G+, Tr. 28, :30, 31 ).
Dr. El Hoy X elson, Yic·(• Pn•sident and J<~conomist
of First Seeurity ( 'orporation, testified that the Comptroller of tlw CmTPney has not given approval or gTanted
authority for tltt· operation of the drive-in facilitiPs of
First fiPcluit.'· Bank at +th South and Main Street in
Salt Lake City, as shown on tlw photograph marked Exhibit "1" (R. 16-17), for the drive-in faeilities at Provo,
l~tah, whieh an~ 300 feet from the main building, nor
for the drive-in facility at Brigham City, Ftah, which
is s<:>parated from tht> main building by an abstract officr,
a barlwr shop and a nineteen foot alley (R. (-i4, Tr. 18-19).
He also frstified that First Security Bank is operating
many drive-in facilities throughout the Statt> and that
most of First SPcurit.'·'s offices in the Salt Lake arPa
have Pither a present drive-in facility or one is undPr
con::-;trnetion. X one of thesP facilities are operated pursuant to iwnuission or authority from the Comptroller
of the Currency. (Ibid.)
Aprwllant argues that a morP definitp statute dealing
with drive-in facilities would protE~ct the banking communit.'· from losing largt> capital investments in drivein facilities hecamw of now heing forced to s1wculatP
whether drive-in facilitiPs will be allowed to operate
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th<·.'· an· constnwfrd. ThP argu11H·nt ovPrlooks the
ind that a deknnination h.'· this court that l'Pspondent's
dr.w-in t'a<"ilitiPs in question an• a braneh would jeo11i11"liz<· the large inwshtwnt in driVf'-in facilities now
J11·inµ; opPrah·d in this stah' which are comparable to the
i':wilitiPs in qlwstion.

11n<·<·

( D)

USAGE AND PRACTICE UNDT,~R THE S'l1ATUTE IX QFJ1~STION SUPPORT RESPONDENT'S POSITION.
CO~ll\IOX

l '01111110n usage and praetice under a statute are of

:.:r<·at valrn~ in determining its meaning when a statute
i,- arnhiguons. In ~2 C..J.S. Statutes ~ 358, Practical
l'nnstnwtion or Usage, it is said:
< ln

thP prineipal of contemporaneous Pxposi-

t i011, common usage and practice under the stat-

1th•, or a course of conduct indicating a particular
understanding of it, will frequently be of great
rnhw in detPnnining its real meaning, especially
\dt<'rP 1hL• usagP has bePn acquiesced in by all
partiPs concerned and has extended over a. long
p<'riod of tinw. A practical construction of a
statntP is not conclusive on the courts, but, if unvarying for a long period of time, it should be
disrPganh·d only for thE> most cogent rPasons.
TIH• tt·stimon.'- n•ceived at trial from Dr. ElRoy
\<·Ison of the First 8Pcnrity Bank and from Spencer
Tarlor, the chief ha11king examiner of the State Banking
llPparhuent with rPgard to the course of conduct of a
l anking co111mlmity undPr thP statute in question estahli,:l1<·s 1liat the ('Ollllnnnit.'·'s nndPrstanding of the irn•an1

111µ; of th<· :-:tatut<> mluld allow <lriv(•-in faeilities of th«

natun· n·:-:pornl<·nt is now OJH_'l'ating in Logan. 'l1hat th<·
hanking· eo11m1tmit:--· has adoptPd this understanding of
tht~ lll<'aning· of th<> statnte for a long lH'riod of ti1ne i;-;
evicl(•nc<•d h:--· thP nu111lwr of drin·-in faciliti<·s which now
Pxist thrnughout the StatP of ·utah.

Thi· 19::1:) LPgislatme in defining "branch" dealt
with th<> situation as it thm existed. The State Bank
Co11m1issi01wr and th<> Cornptrollt>r of t1w Currency havt>
eonstnwcl thP statntP in light of presPnt day methods of
transacting busin<'ss whidt have lPd to the common pra<·tiC'e of th<.> establis}nnent and operation of drive-in f'aci litiPs h:--· tlw hanking co11mnmity. The reasons supporting an affirmation by this eourt of the common usagP
and pradie<> undPr this statute arP mon• compelling than
any hypothetical situation that appdlant has set forth
in support of its contention that this court should set
asidP tlw lower court's ruling.
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COXCLFSIOX
'l'h<' l<~indings of Fad made by the lower court and
tJH· t('stimony given at trial (•stablish that t1H• drive-in
and walk-up fa<'ilities in question are a part of respon(knt's Logan branch bank and constitut(' a mere exten:-:ion or !'nlarg<'lllPnt of ~mid branch which will provide
l1vttn sP rviC't> to respondent's C'Ustomers. ThPrt>fore, the
jndg111Pnt of the trial court should he affirmed since the
1·:-;tablishment and operation by respondent of said faciliti1·" do not constitute thP (•stablishment of a "branch"
liank \\'ithin tlw meaning of U.C.A. 1953, 7-3-6, as
111l 1Pn<1Pd.

Res1wctfully :,,;ubmitted,
.Joseph S. Jone::.;
W. Robert Wright

HAY, RA VvLINS, JONES,
& HENDERSON
800 Walker Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
AttornPys for Respondfnt
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A J>J>E);"DfX
Opini011 of l "tah Attorney UenPral, );"o. lifi-0:25 and
RelatPd Docmnents

(H'T•'IC'E OF 'I'l-11•: A'l'TORXEY
S'l'A'l'E OF FTAH

o~:xJ<~RAL

OPfNlOX OF LA""
X o. Gu-0:25

Request!•d h~· \Y. S. Brimhall, Vtah State Bank Cornmissiorn·r, 57-1- East SPcond South, Salt Lah City, Utah.
Prepared hy Attonwy <lPnt-ral Phil L. Hansm and Staff.
QCl•~STIOX

::\lay a hank t>stablish driv-P-in facilitiPs for the
cashing of checks, making deposits, and performing such banking functions as can be accomplished
at a driw-in facility on property ownPd by tlw
hank, but st>parated from the bank building by a
drive\\·ay not owned by the bank, said drive-in
facility and tlw bank building to be connected
hy a p1wnmatie tube undf'r tlw drivevvay for c·onve>·ing money and papt-rs back and forth, as well
as television facilities "·hich will enable the cu~
tomer and the teller in the hank to see and convt'l'se with Pach other'?

CONCLlTSION

This ovinion is limited, however, to the faetnal situation presentPd.

lHS.

OPIKJOX

lTndt•r thP hanking lmrn of the State of lTtah, a bank
ma>· conduct its business only at its hanking house. Any
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ntlwr officf:s, ageneies, or places of husinPss at \\'hich a
!Jank way receive deposits, pay checks, or loan money
arP known as "branches." In order to establish a branch,
a hank must follow a procedure set forth in the statutes
in order to obtain a license from the State Bank Comrnission<"r for the establishment of the branch. Section
7-3-G, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended (1963),
provides in part:
'fhe business of every bank shall be eonducted
only at its banking house and every bank shall
receive deposits and pay cheeks only at its banking house except as herf'inafter provided.
\Vith the consent of the bank commissioner,
any hank having a paid-in capital and surplus of
not less than $60,000 may establish and orwrate
one branch for the transaction of its business;
provided, that for each additional branch established there shall be paid in an additional $60,000
(capital and surplus).
The term "branch'' as used in this act shall
be held to include any branch bank, branch office,
branch agency, additional office, or any branch
place of business at which deposits are received
or checks paid or money lent.

'L'Jw instant problem is to determine whether the
proposed drive--in facility is a branch or a part of the
hanking housP.
It appears reasonably clear from thP abovP statutPs
that thP proposed drive-in facility, if it were not conTH>dt>d to the hank building by a pneumatic tube and
tPlevision, would be a branch. This was the effect of a
ldt11r from thr Attorney General, State of Utah, to tlw
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l·tah !--itatP Hank Cornrnissionn, datt>d Novemb<~r 8, 19;)7,
in whi('h tlH· Attorney Cle1wral advised the Bank Commissioner that a driYP-in facility locatrd 14-1 fed from
tlw bank hnilding was a branch hank.
HO\n•wr, it seems that in this particular situation
thP proposed driw-in facility would not constitute a
hraneh, hut would he an integral part of tlw banking
hons<'. ll<>n·, the hank building and thP clriw-in faeility
are separah•d by a driVl'Wa>·, but they an• physically
attaelwd, in a s<'nse, by tlw pnemnatic tube. The teller
is locatPd in the hank building and tlw mone>· and docunwnts pass haek and forth hetwef>n the customer and thf'
tt>llt>r via tlw pnPmnatic tube. The customer and the teller
ean talk with and set> each other by rneans of tPlevision.
It appears more logical, under tht>se facts, to conclude
that tlw driw-in facility is a part of the banking housf'
ratlwr than a branch hank.
Aside from the abovp conclusion that tlw proposed
drive-in facilit>· is part of the banking house, it could
lw persuasively argn<•d that tlw banking transaction aetually takes place within the hank where the teller is
located, thus mePting the requirements of Section 7-:3-fi,
Utah Code Annotated, ] 953, quotc~d abow, that "the
businPss of t>wry bank shall he conducted only at it~
banking house and PVPry bank shall receivP deposits and
pay clwcks onl>· at its hanking house> ... " This situation,
it appears, is distinguishable from tht> one in Continental
Bank and Trust Company v. Taylor, 38-1- P.2d 796 (Utah
1963), in whieh the Utah Supreme Court held that tlw
making· of loans by a bank through insurancf> agents who
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prt>parNl t hl' rn·<·<·;,:sar:- dof'unwnts for finanf'ing the sale
(ii' :rntornohil<'s and immntn('(' tlwreon and tlwn forwarded
:-;aid doem1wnb to tlw bank eonstitnt('d branch banking.
Tlw basis of tlw <·<mrt's dPcision was that the transactions
\\'<'l'\' <'OJll}Jl<'t<>d by thp insurance agPnts, who were agents
of th<> hank, outside of tht> banking hous<>. The court said:
\Ve e<msider tlw transaction completC'd and
the morn•y "lent" at the time ( 1) the executed note
and mortgage are delivf:'red to the representative
of thP Bank, and whether he is an insurance agent
and whether or not he is paid by the Bank are
i1111uaterial factors, and ( 2) the customer is authorized by tlw Bank to draw checks thereon.
From tlw foregoing rationale, it is concluded that
it \\'OU kl not he unlawful for the propost>d drive-in fa1·ilit:· to he constrnctr>d and operated in the manner de~<·rihed in tl10 <gwstion. This opinion, however, is limited
to th<• partici1lar factual situaton presented.
Dated this 25th day of March, 1966.
RespPctfully submitted,
Attornt>y GPneral Phil L. Hansen
[signed]
l'LH/hwv/bp
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SPHJX(J\'JLLE lL\XKIX<l CO.

EstahliHhed 1891

.T ul~· 1ti. 1~1:l7
Mr. 8Pth Young8tate Hank Connnissiorn'r
State Capitol
Salt Lak<> Cit~·. l~tah
Dear

~l'th:

I all\ Pndosing a rtah

Count~·

12 Plat "A'', Springville City.

Plats Plan of Block

You will notiee in this plat that our Bank Building
i.s on tlw rig-ht-hand corn(-lr and from marked point "A"
thl' W(-lst corner of our building to marked point "B" the
east point of our propert~· now used as a parking lot i~
141.25 frd. Our plan is to U:'-1<' tlw pro1wrty to tlw west
of th(> hank lmilding- for a possihle dri.v(-l-in loeation and
a possible sitP for onr saff' d1>posit vault.

It was ~·our sugg(-lstion that I suhmit tlw i)lat HO
that yon could tum it over to thf' Attornl'~· General to
see 'Yheth<>r sueh a plan would comply with th<> hanking
laws of th(> Stat(' of Ptah.
Yours V(-lry truly,
/s/ F. C. Packard
President

FCP:c·

encl

[A copy of the plat referred to in this and the following letters is reproduced on the fold-out, inside ha<'l,
cover.]
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July 18, 1957

11 onorabl<• g. R. Callister
State of Utah
Capitol Building

Dl'ar

~lr.

Callister:

One of our state-chartered banks has inqnirPd of us
as to whether or not it would be possible to use the
property to the west of its building for a drive-in location
and a possible site for a safe deposit vault.
A copy of the letter is attached for your further information.

Will you please give me your opinion on the above
matter.
Very truly yours,
/s/ Seth H. Young
Bank Commissioner
~HY

Ene.

:rnrn

AJ:,;o enclosed is a Utah County Plats Plan of Block 12
Plat ''A'', Springville City, which please return to this

office.
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).'" OVPJlllH•r

8, 1937

Seth H. Y onng
Bank l'o111111issimwr
Buikling
D<>ar Mr. Young:
Yon havp asked whdher a state bank may open a
"drive-in., location l.:tl feet from its main banking house
without complying with tlw provisions of the Utah law
relating to branch banks. In my opinion, such question
must he answered in tlw ne>gative, and I have heretofor<'
verbally expre>ssed this view to officials of the bank
concerned. HowevPr, in order to confirm this previom;
conversation, I submit tlw following for your consideration.
Section 7-8-G, F.C.A. 1953, as amendt>d, provides in
part:
The lmsi11ess of every bank shall lJe conducted
mily at its ba·nking ho11se and e1.:cry lwnk shall receive drposits a11d pay checks only at its banking
house except as hereinafter provided.

·with the consent of the bank commissioner
and the approval of the governor, any bank havinga paid-in capital and surplus of not less than $60,000 may (•stablish and opPrate one branch for th('
transaction of its business; provided, that [for]
Pach additional hran('h established there shall bL·
paid in an additional $GO,OOO (capital and surplus).
The term "branch" as used in this act shall
be held to include any bramch bank, branch offfrf,
bra.nch agency, additional office, or any branch
place of business at ichich deposits are receiced 01
checks paid or money lent.
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,\11~· hank desiring to 1•stahlish on\' or more
branches or offices shall file a written application
tlwn·for in such form and containing such inforniation as the hank commissioner may require.
X o hank shall he permitted to establish any branch
or office until it shall first have been shown to
tlH• satisfaction of the hank commissioner and the
gowrnor that the puhlie convenience and advantage will he suhsf'rved and prornotf'd by the establislmH'nt of such hranch of [or] office and the
hank eommissioner may by order permitting the
PstahlishrnPnt of such branch or office designate
and limit the character of work and service which
n1ay tlwrein he pt>rfornwd. (J<~mphasis added.)

ln my opinion, tht> vropospd drive-in location is so
banking house that it is a branch
hranch agency or additional office
within the contemplation of Section 7-3-6, supra. Therei'11rP, tl1P provisions gowrning the branching of hanks
\'. 11111<1 lH' appli<·ahlc> and the state hank in question may
1 11t l'stahlish thP drive-in faeility without making formal
applieation for a branch and otherwise complying with
tiH• l'tah law, particularly 8f'etion 7-3-6, U.C.A. 1953,

~q1arat('d from the
l1:rnk, hraneh offiee,

1

:1~ nlllPlH}ed.

Y ery truly yours,

RAYMOXD \V. GEE
Assistant Attonwy General
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